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FICORCA debt is held by  13.4 percent of  the firms. The fifty largest firms 
alone account for 57 percent of the total debt. 
The FICORCA  facility  probably  prevented  a  chain  of  bankruptcies  in 
1982. The major risk  is that  the facility  will become a fiscal drain.  If  the 
domestic  interest  rate  drops  below  its  parity  level,  FICORCA  grants  a 
permanent subsidy to the indebted companies. So far, this has not happened. 
Between April  1983 and April  1987, FICORCA generated net revenues for 
the government. 
Two  large,  well-known  Mexican  companies,  Alfa  and  Moctezuma, 
defaulted  and  withdrew  from  FICORCA  until  they  could  work  out  a 
restructuring  agreement with their creditors.  In both cases, the banks took 
some losses. The Alfa group’s debt was $2.6 billion, of which $900 million 
belonged to the holding company while the remainder represented liabilities 
of HYLSA, its steel company. A steering committee was formed by Bank of 
America, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and Morgan Guaranty. The restructur- 
ing of the holding company’s debt involved a cash payment of $25 million, 
conversion of $200 million into peso-denominated  debt, and a swap of  the 
remaining  debt  for  equity.  Mexican  shareholders have  a  priority  right  to 
acquire any stock the banks sell. 
Moctezuma, one of the nation’s largest breweries, obtained an even better 
deal. Its $307 million debt was rescheduled to be repaid over fourteen years 
with  a  six-year  grace period.  The interest  rate  on half  of  the  debt  ($154 
million) is fixed at 3 percent, while for the other half the rate is LIBOR  + 
0.25 percent.  Interest accumulated during the two years of negotiations was 
also forgiven. 
9  Future Prospects: Is There 
A Way Out? 
At the time of this writing (early 1988), prospects for the Mexican economy 
appear very  dim. After  achieving  small but positive per capita growth  in 
1984 and  1985, the economy was  sent reeling by the sharp drop in world 
market oil prices in  1986. The De La Madrid administration reacted to the 
oil shock by dispensing a stronger dose of austerity. Real fiscal spending was 
reduced slightly, and real credit to the private sector cut 9.6 percent. To limit 
the deterioration in the payments balance, the rate of depreciation of the peso 
was raised substantially, culminating in  a huge 32 percent  real devaluation 
by  the end of  the year.  These policies,  in conjunction with the fall  in oil 
prices, resulted in triple-digit inflation (105.7 percent) and a decline in real 529  MexicoIChapter 9 
output of 3.7 percent. In November 1986, the government announced in the 
General  Criteria for  Economic  Policy  that  its  goals  were  to  reduce  the 
inflation rate by 25-30  percentage points and to sustain a 3 percent growth 
rate over the next two years. Neither of these targets now seems attainable 
anytime soon. According to preliminary figures, in  1987 real  output grew 
only 1.1 percent and the inflation rate accelerated to 159 percent. 
Not  only  are  the  prospects  for  recovering  an  acceptable  growth  rate 
unpromising, but there is also a risk that, in the absence of  policy reform, 
inflation will continue rising.  The expenditure cuts and debt restructuring 
following the collapse in oil prices in the first half of  1986 have not proven 
sufficient to prevent  a large increase in the fiscal deficit. The inflationary 
impetus  created  by  the  sharp  deterioration  in  the  fiscal  balance  is  still 
working  itself  out.  In  chapter  7,  it  was  demonstrated  that  the  long-run 
inflation  multiplier for  a  shock of  this  type  can be  extremely large after 
taking account of the mutually reinforcing nature of slow capital accumula- 
tion,  financial  disintermediation,  and  rising  fiscal  deficits.  Mexico  now 
seems to be caught up in this spiral and faces the threat that inflation will 
continue its relentless, upward march and soon reach (if it has not done so 
already) levels producing severe economic and social dislocations. 
Can Mexico pull out of its economic demise in the near future? Given the 
current schedule for debt service, the high growth rates enjoyed during most 
of  the post-World  War  I1 period are probably out of  reach. Policy reforms 
can,  however,  stimulate  greater  growth  without  intensifying  inflationary 
pressures or  causing  the  payments  balance  to  deteriorate.  The  next  two 
sections discuss in detail the implications of  the study for fiscal, monetary, 
exchange rate, and trade policy. 
9.1  The Mix of Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
When the economy is operating at full capacity, an increase in debt service 
requires a reduction in domestic absorption. The De La Madrid administration 
chose to combine cuts in current and capital expenditures with an extremely 
restrictive monetary policy  involving high  marginal (and  average) reserve 
requirements and bond financing of a large fraction of the fiscal deficit. These 
policies resulted in massive financial disintermediation and a virtual monop- 
olization of  new  credit flows by  the public sector. The extreme nature of 
recent monetary policy is apparent from table 9.1 and figure 9.1. Between 
1981 and 1986, the real total shock of bank funds (M4 less currency held by 
the public) contracted 37 percent and total real credit to the private sector 
declined 33 percent. Financial disintermediation was so great that in  1986 the 
real stock of bank funds barely exceeded its 1972 value and, as a fraction of 
GDP, stood at its lowest level since 1966. By contrast, the credit share of the 
entire financial system (which includes Central Bank credit) rose from 42 to 
57 percent of GDP during 1981-86. 530  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 9.1  Bank Funds and Total Credit of the Financial System, 1%1-86p 
Year 
1961  13.2  24.7 
1962  14.5  26.6 
1963  15.8  27.5 
1964  16.2  27.7 
1965  17.8  30.5 
1966  19.3  32.4 
1967  21.6  34.6 
1968  23.2  36.1 
1969  25.1  311.4 
1970  27.0  40.6 
1971  28.7  42.2 
1972  28.9  42.1 
1973  27.0  40.4 
1974  23.1  37.6 
1975  23.8  38.7 
1976  22.2  41.4 
1977  20.2  41.9 
1978  21.7  42.6 
1919  22.6  41.4 
19110  22.4  39.7 
1981  23.8  42.1 
1982  24.0  51.9 
1983  21.9  50.3 
1984  21.6  45.2 
1985  20.8  47.8 
1986  20.3  56.5 
Total Stock of  Bank Fundsb  Total Credit of the Financial System' 
Sources: Indicadores Economicos  (Bank  of  Mexico)  and  Esfadisficas  Hisroricas de  Mexico,  table  21.16 
(Mexico, D.F.:  INEGI). 
"Average of  beginning- and end-of-year stock divided by nominal GDP. 
bM4 less currency held by the public. 
'Sum  of  credit extended by the Central Bank, commercial banks, and development banks. 
It was shown in chapter 7 that the various policies employed to divert credit 
from the private to the public sector have lowered growth by depressing the 
pace of  private  sector capital accumulation. Given  that,  in  general, it  is 
optimal to adjust to higher debt service by decreasing both present and future 
consumption, a reduction in investment is not necessarily cause for concern. 
For  several reasons, however, the magnitude of  the contraction in  private 
sector investment seen in Mexico seems excessive. Numerous externalities 
cause the social return on investment to exceed its private return: (1) the social 
return on capital accumulation includes revenues accruing to the government 
from the corporate profits tax; (2) in a decentralized economy, the isolation 
paradox (see Sen 1967) is likely to result in undersaving; (3) on the plausible 
assumptions  that  capital  and  labor  are  gross  complements  and  that  the 
high-wage and  capital-intensive sectors coincide, capital accumulation re- 
duces underemployment, lessening the distortion in the labor market; and (4) 
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Fig. 9.1  Real credit of the total financial system and the real stock of bank 
funds, 1960-86 
accumulation may be accompanied by a “demonstration effect,” increasing 
the rate of technological transfer and productivity growth. It should be added 
as well that while a decrease in investment lowers inflation in the short run, 
the ensuing reduction in productive capacity tends to increase the inflation rate 
over the medium and long run; and though the welfare costs of inflation are 
not  well  understood, it is indisputable that  they  become nontrivial  when 
inflation moves toward the triple-digit range. 
A shift toward greater fiscal austerity and more expansive monetary policy 
is imperative to stimulate the recovery of  private investment. One possible 
package  is  to  combine further  cuts  in  public  sector consumption with  a 
reduction in  the reserve requirement  (interpreted as the  sum of  the  legal 
reserve ratio and mandatory credit to the government), maintenance of  real 
deposit rates of 4-7  percent, and increased monetization of the fiscal deficit. 
The maintenance of high real deposit rates should help deter capital flight 
and maintain a healthy flow of  funds into the banking system, while lower 
reserve requirements and increased monetization of  the fiscal deficit would 
permit the share of  credit to the private sector to be enlarged. Provided the 532  Edward F.  Buffie 
proper balance is maintained between monetary expansion and expenditure 
cuts, there should not be any adverse short-run repercussions on inflation or 
the  current account balance,  the  stimulus to  demand from higher private 
sector investment being  offset by  the reduction in  the  fiscal deficit. Some 
would  argue  as  well  (e.g.  Dornbusch  1987)  that  a  more  hospitable 
investment climate will encourage a reversal of  capital flight. 
There  is  much  to  be  said  for  lowering the  fiscal deficit predominantly 
through  further  cuts  in  consumption expenditure (and  less  investment by 
inefficient branches of the parastatal sector). If  the model of chapter 7 is an 
acceptable guide, this is the one expenditure item that  can be  cut without 
adversely affecting the growth rate. Cuts in other expenditure items and tax 
hikes  are  distinctly  inferior  alternatives.  A  reduction  in  public  sector 
infrastructure investment depresses  capital  accumulation by  lowering the 
productivity  of  private sector capital.  Public sector layoffs and wage cuts 
reduce  private sector income  and  lead  to  capital decumulation as  deposit 
holdings decline and financial disintermediation takes place. Increases in the 
value-added tax or income taxes have highly uncertain effects upon financial 
intermediation and the incentives for private investment.* If tax increases are 
indispensable for lowering the  fiscal deficit, they  can be  combined either 
with  other  fiscal  measures  enhancing  the  productivity  of  private  sector 
capital (greater infrastructure investment, for example) or, at the very least, 
with a moderately expansionary monetary policy. 
Two objections are commonly made against proposals for shifting toward 
tighter fiscal policy (but only of the right type) and looser monetary policy. 
The first is  that  further  fiscal  austerity is  infeasible in  view  of  the  steep 
expenditure cuts that have already been made since 1982. This objection lacks 
force.  Certainly, the  De  La  Madrid  administration reduced  spending sig- 
nificantly and further cutbacks in some areas may have to be phased in gradu- 
ally. Nonetheless, there is a solid case for lowering expenditures still more. 
Table 9.2 shows how nonwage current expenditures, inclusive and exclusive 
of  interest payments, have evolved since  1965. The GDP share of  current 
expenditure net of external debt service in 1986 was more than triple its 1970 
value. Even if  all interest payments (i.e., on both the internal and external 
debt) are excluded, “other”  nonwage current expenditures in 1986 claimed 
7 percent more of GDP than total nonwage current expenditures in  1970. 
In this connection, it should also be pointed out that reductions in current 
expenditure today can pave the way for higher real expenditure (or smaller 
reductions than  would  otherwise be  necessary) in the future.  Expenditure 
cuts make it  immediately possible to focus monetary policy on promoting 
private sector capital accumulation. As growth  increases, it then becomes 
possible to reconcile a smaller expenditure share in GNP with a higher level 
of expenditure in real terms. 
A second objection to this proposed alteration in the fiscal-monetary policy 
mix is that it does too little to combat inflation. But if the battle against inflation 533  Mexico/Chapter 9 
Table 9.2  Share of Nonwage Current Expenditure in GDP,  1965-86 

























































































Sources:  Wage data for 1983-86 and all data for 1986 are from Indicadores Economicos (Bank of Mexico). 
All other data are from SHCP. 
Notes:  Total public sector wage payments are the sum of  wage payments by  the federal district, the federal 
government, the  budget-controlled  parastatal  sector,  and  the  nonbudget-controlled  parastataJ  sector.  For 
1965-69,  the peso value of  interest payments on the foreign debt is estimated as the product of  the period 
average controlled exchange rate and the dollar value of  interest payments. 
is fought with policies that lower the investment rate, any victories won are 
likely to prove ephemeral. For while a decrease in investment lowers inflation 
in the short run, the ensuing reduction in productive capacity and real output 
gives rise to powerful inflationary pressures beyond the short run (through 
lower demand for the monetary base, rising real bond rates, and falling tax 
revenues).  As  shown in chapter 7, for this reason,  many  anti-inflationary 
policies are largely or entirely self-defeating over the long run. 
Which brings up a final issue. I have proposed that easier monetary policy 
be  linked  with  tighter  fiscal  policy.  If  political  constraints  require  that 
expenditure  cuts  be  phased  in  only  slowly,  should  more  expansionary 
monetary  policy  be  introduced on  its  own  in  an  effort to  accelerate the 
timetable for recovery of the targetted growth rate? 
This notion has some appeal in view of the conclusion in chapter 7 that in 
the  long  run,  expansionary credit  policy  succeeds  in  raising  output  and 
lowering the  inflation rate.3 Delinking monetary  policy  from the  pace  of 
fiscal reform, however, is a very dangerous step. The analysis of chapter 7 
neglected  problems  associated  with  the  adjustment  process.  While  the 
current account remains in balance across stationary equilibria, in the short 534  Edward F.  Buffie 
run more expansionary monetary policy will drive up the inflation rate and 
worsen the trade balance if  there is no compensating fiscal retrenchment. If 
the government lacks an ample supply of  foreign exchange reserves or if 
inflation is already near socially unacceptable levels, a more expansionary 
credit policy  is  neither politically nor  financially feasible unless  supple- 
mented by either temporary expenditure cuts or debt relief.4 
9.2  Trade and Exchange Rate Policy 
The experience of  1982-83  clearly convinced the Mexican government 
that import controls are not the best policy instrument for rectifying balance 
of  payments problems (Znforme Anual 1986, 21-22).  The Central Bank is 
now  committed to  maintaining a  heavily  devalued  currency  in  order  to 
preserve payments equilibrium and allow trade liberalization to go forward 
~ninterrupted.~  Initially plans called for all import quotas to be replaced by a 
schedule of five tariffs ranging from zero to 30 percent, with the higher rates 
applying largely to consumer goods. These plans have since been scrapped in 
favor of a more ambitious liberalization program. As of early 1988, a flat 20 
percent tariff applied to nearly all import categories and quantitative restric- 
tions had been virtually eliminated. Since the value-added tax is 15 percent, 
it is almost correct to say that free trade prevails with respect to imports. 
The De La Madrid administration’s commitment to trade liberalization is 
generally commendable, but it is doubtful whether, overall, this commercial 
policy/exchange rate package delivers the right set of relative prices. In  a 
second-best world where underinvestment and underemployment cannot be 
eliminated by appropriate wage and rental subsidies, trade policy should be 
structured so as to lower the prices of  imported intermediates and  capital 
goods relative to the prices of final goods since normally (i.e., when factors 
are  gross  complements) increased usage  of  these  factors  will  raise  the 
demand for domestic labor and stimulate capital accumulation. Optimal trade 
policy thus entails an escalated structure of protection in both the import and 
export  sectors,  a  policy  of  import  substitution-cum-export  promotion. 
Recent theoretical work indicates that the optimal degree of escalation in the 
structure of protection is often quite pronounced when, as in the Mexican 
case, the labor market is highly distorted and a large fraction of exportable 
output  is  not  consumed  domestically.6  Accordingly,  while  full  trade 
liberalization for imported intermediates and capital goods seems desirable, 
consideration should be given to combining low (or zero) duties on these 
imports with tariffs on consumer imports and  subsidies for nonoil exports 
substantially above 30 percent. This, it is interesting to note, is very similar 
to  the  trade  policy  followed  by  the  successful,  export-oriented  LDCs 
(Taiwan,  South  Korea,  Singapore,  and  Pakistan),  where  the  import- 
competing sector has always been heavily protected. What has distinguished 535  MexicoIChapter 9 
there trade regime from those of many other LDCs is that the export sector is 
promoted to an equal extent so that the overall bias of trade policy is small.’ 
The same reasons for favoring a trade regime of import substitution-cum- 
export  promotion  militate  against  the  policy  of  maintaining  a  heavily 
depreciated currency. A strongly depreciated peso promotes nonoil exports, 
but  also induces import compression. As the analysis of chapters 6 and 7 
suggests, and Mexican experience has repeatedly shown, import compression 
is invariably accompanied by a severe contraction in private sector investment 
and greater open unemployment or underemployment. An alternative method 
of dealing with a fundamental payments imbalance is to increase tariffs on 
consumer imports and nonoil export subsidies while following a neutral real 
exchange  rate  policy.  This  combination of  policies  make  it  possible  to 
maintain the flow of  critical imported inputs by  generating a larger trade 
surplus in final goods and services, thereby avoiding the severe contractionary 
pressures produced by  import compression. 
A potential difficulty exists with this alternative to large, real devaluations 
in that the cost of  export subsidies may  exceed the revenues raised from 
higher tariffs on consumer imports.  (Tariff revenue may fall, of course, if 
demand is elastic.) In this event, it is necessary that the revenue shortfall be 
covered by  cuts in  government expenditures. With money  financing, the 
impact on inflation could be explosive. 
9.3  Conclusion 
Just  how  much  improvement  in  the  economy’s  performance  can  be 
expected from the policy reforms sketched in the preceding two sections? 
Even with a fully specified macroeconometric model, this question could not 
be answered with a great deal of accuracy. My own, tentative opinion is that 
better policy would enable the government to attain its target growth rate of 
3 percent without suffering higher inflation or a worsening in the payments 
balance. But  3 percent growth is  hardly  a notable accomplishment in  an 
economy where real  GDP grew at an annual average rate of  6.8 percent 
between 1950 and 1981. Indeed, it should be remembered that only in recent 
years has it become normal to speak of  2-3  percent growth as representing 
economic  recovery”;  in  most  of  the  post-World  War  I1  period,  the 
economy was judged to be in a recession if growth dropped below 5 percent. 
It is perhaps fitting to conclude by addressing a controversial normative 
issue I have studiously avoided. The prospect of continuing slow growth will 
inevitably lead to stronger demands for large-scale debt relief. A growth rate 
of  3 percent implies negligible growth per capita terms and steadily rising 
underemployment. Coming on the heels of a five-year period in which real 
per capita income has fallen  13.5 percent and real wages declined 30-40 
percent, this is a very stiff price to pay. 
“ 